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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger upheld
the use of racial affirmative action as a means of increasing student
diversity at the University of Michigan Law School But in doing so,
the Court also prohibited the use of racial quotas in affirmative ac-
tion programs, finding the pursuit of racial balance to be a "patently
unconstitutional" governmental objective Grutters prohibition on
racial balance is nominally rooted in a desire to promote colorblind
race neutrality in the culture's allocation of resources. But ironically,
it is the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance itself that perpetu-
ates contemporary racial discrimination.
For people who believe that the conscious pursuit of racial bal-
ance offers the only realistic hope of achieving a meaningful level of
racial equality in the United States, Grutter is disappointing. It is
reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions, such as Dred Scott,
4
where the Court curiously chose to invalidate efforts by the political
branches to promote racial justice. There are a variety of ways in
which the political branches can resist the racial balance restriction
that Grutter imposes. They range from mild efforts to camouflage the
pursuit of racial balance, to more radical efforts that challenge the le-
gitimacy of judicial review itself. However, the degree to which con-
temporary culture is willing to resist the Supreme Court's prohibition
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See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003) (upholding an educational affirmative
action program that gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants); cf Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating an educational affirmative action program
that awarded a specified number of points to minority applicants as too mechanical to be nar-
rowly tailored).
2 Crutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
3 See id. at 326-27 (asserting preference for race neutrality, and applying strict scrutiny to all
racial classifications, including benign affirmative action classifications).
4 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857) (invalidating a congres-
sional statute prohibiting slavery in the Louisiana Territory).
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on achieving racial balance will be a direct function of the degree to
which the culture is committed to the principle of racial equality.
Part I of this Article argues that the Supreme Court lacks the insti-
tutional competence to formulate racial policy for the nation, and
highlights the tension that exists between the Court's abstract prefer-
ence for race neutrality and the concrete reality of contemporary
race relations, in which dedicated efforts to promote racial balance
offer the only meaningful hope of eliminating systemic dis-
crimination. Part II discusses moderate strategies that can be used to
deflect the impact of Grutteds prohibition on racial balance, suggest-
ing that racial balancing can be restructured in ways that the Su-
preme Court may view as constitutional. Part III discusses more radi-
cal strategies that can be used to promote racial balance, and
advocates a direct confrontation with the institution of judicial review
in the context of affirmative action. The Article concludes that the
political branches of government possess the power to overcome Su-
preme Court impediments to racial justice, and hopes that they also
possess the will to exercise that power.
I. RACIAL POLICY
The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decision in Grutter
v. Bollinger insists that efforts to achieve racial balance are unconstitu-
tional. However, it is far from clear that the Supreme Court should
be viewed as having the institutional competence to make such a de-
termination. Moreover, even if one concedes to the Court the power
to formulate affirmative action policy, the Court's racial balance pro-
hibition still seems wrong on the merits. The current Court is preoc-
cupied with the concept of race neutrality, but the nature of contem-
porary racial discrimination is such that only explicit efforts to
achieve racial balance seem likely to promote racial equality.
A. Institutional Competence
Grutter is premised on the belief that the political branches of gov-
ernment must ask the Supreme Court for permission to solve the
longstanding problem of racial discrimination in the United States.
That is a curious premise for at least three reasons. First, the institu-
tion of judicial review cannot plausibly be understood to give the Su-
preme Court the countermajoritarian power to formulate racial pol-
icy in a democratic society. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment
5 539 U.S. at 306.
6 See id. at 330 (stating that the use of racial quotas "would amount to outright racial balanc-
ing, which is patently unconstitutional.").
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gives Congress-not the Supreme Court-the power to remedy dis-
crimination against racial minorities, thereby making it anomalous
for the Supreme Court to invalidate majoritarian affirmative action
programs on the grounds that the Court knows better than the politi-
cal branches what will satisfy the equal protection demands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Supreme Court has such a dis-
mal record in the protection of racial minority rights that it is difficult
to see why anyone with a genuine interest in promoting racial justice
would believe that the Court could do a better job than the political
branches in protecting minority rights.
The existence of judicial review in a democratic society has always
been problematic. It poses the countermajoritarian danger that un-
elected judges, who are intentionally insulated from political ac-
countability, will have the ability to formulate social policy in ways
that trump the policy preferences of the representative branches of
government.7 Although the constitutional legitimacy of judicial re-
view is now widely accepted, it is difficult to imagine that the Framers
envisioned anything like the role that the Supreme Court has come
to play in the debate over controversial social issues such as abortion,
8school prayer, and affirmative action. A species of judicial review
that limited Supreme Court involvement in the political process to
the enforcement of determinate norms that were clearly expressed in
the Constitution could perhaps be reconciled with the process of
democratic self governance.9 However, it is difficult to deem democ-
ratic the Supreme Court's substitution of judicial policy preferences
for political policy preferences in the interpretation of constitutional
norms that are inherently political in nature.
7 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-45 (4th ed. 2001) (dis-
cussing the countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review). The Constitution attempts
to insulate the Supreme Court from political influence through the devices of life tenure and
salary protection. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (declaring that "[tihe Judges, both of the su-
preme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."). See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE
SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14-15 (1993) [hereinafter RACE
AGAINST THE COURT) (discussing formal safeguards for Supreme Court independence).
8 In asserting the power of judicial review, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the diffi-
culty inherent in allowing the Supreme Court to resolve innately political questions. See Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that "[t]he province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive offi-
cers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.").
9 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936) (describing the mechanical proc-
ess ofjudicial review); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 35-39 (discussing mechanical inter-
pretations of the Constitution as a response to the countermajoritarian difficulty).
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The Constitution, of course, says nothing about affirmative action,
and the Supreme Court's only constitutional basis for regulating the
content of affirmative action programs stems from the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."' But it is hard to find in the phrase "equal protection"
any justification for Supreme Court invalidation of affirmative action
burdens that the political majority has chosen to impose upon itself
to "equalize" the status of those racial minorities whom American cul-
ture has historically treated as inferior. One could, of course, vig-
orously dispute what it takes to promote racial "equality" in contem-
porary culture. However, it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court
should be viewed as institutionally more competent than the political
branches of government to resolve that dispute."
Things get worse when one remembers that the equal protection
guarantee used by the Supreme Court as the basis for regulating af-
firmative action is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to authorize the Supreme
Court to formulate racial policy. Rather, it was adopted in order to
authorize Congress to enhance the status of racial minorities, and to
protect such congressional "affirmative action" from Supreme Court
invalidation. After the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which was designed to end discrimination against former
black slaves in places of public accommodation. However, federalism
doubts about the constitutionality of the Act prompted adoption of
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."). The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment also contains a tacit equal protection component that applies to
the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (finding a tacit
equal protection safeguard in the Fifth Amendment).
1 For a more extended argument against judicial review in the context of racial discrimina-
tion, see RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7. Other scholars have presented general argu-
ments questioning the scope and desirability of judicial review. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-5 (1996) (favoring "incompletely theorized agree-
ments" over comprehensive or definitive judicial resolutions of controversial political issues);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)
(favoring narrow Supreme Court decisions that permit democratic reflection by the elected
branches); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (dis-
favoring judicial review); see also Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, and Moral Disagreement, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399-1400 (1997) (reviewing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996), and favoring political overjudicial resolutions of morally charged
political conflicts); MichaelJ. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 414 (1997) (arguing,
as a positive matter, that judicial review often entails mere deference to majoritarian political
preferences). But see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (favoring judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation to be binding on other branches of government).
12 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (stating that affirmative action
programs have to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contained the substantive equal protection guarantee,"3 and
Section 5 authorized Congress to enforce the provisions of Section 114
precisely so that the Supreme Court would not invalidate such reme-
dial efforts on constitutional grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment,
therefore, was designed to authorize political remedies for racial dis-
crimination, and to give federal remedies primacy over state "Black
Codes" that had officially legislated the inferiority of blacks.'5 Noth-
ing in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment can plausibly be
read to authorize the Supreme Court to invalidate state or federal po-
litical enactments that are designed to enhance the status of racial mi-
norities. Rather, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes
that questions about the policy prudence and the constitutional valid-
ity of affirmative action are questions that, in Marbury terms, are "in
their nature political.'
16
When the majority, acting through the political branches of gov-
ernment, chooses to impose a burden on itself in order to advance its
understanding of racial equality, there is no basis for invoking the
heightened judicial scrutiny that the Court typically reserves for cases
involving suspect governmental motives. In representation-reinforce-
ment terms, there is no reason to fear that the majoritarian political
process is seeking to disadvantage a discrete-and-insular minority
group that is unable to protect its own interests in the pluralist politi-
cal process." The Supreme Court asserts that judicial intervention in
the affirmative action debate is needed to protect the individual
equal protection rights of whites who are burdened by affirmative ac-
tion.' But that merely begs the question. Whites burdened by af-
firmative action are not unconstitutionally discriminated against any
more than methadone users who are denied municipal employment
because of their participation in drug treatment programs. But the
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal protection to all individuals).
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."). The other Reconstruction Amendments had
similar provisions authorizing Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, to enforce their sub-
stantive guarantees. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the
prohibition against involuntary servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (authorizing Congress
to enforce the right to vote without abridgment on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude).
15 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 431-33 (discussing the history of the Reconstruction
Amendments).
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
17 For the prevailing account of how government policymakers can discount the interests of
discrete-and-insular minorities, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
18 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause
protects persons rather than groups) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995)).
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Supreme Court defers to the value judgments made by the political
branches in the methadone case, while strictly scrutinizing the value
judgments made by the political branches in affirmative action
cases.' 9 This is true even though methadone users, who are likely to
be both poor and members of racial minority groups,'° would seem to
present a much stronger claim to discrete-and-insular minority status
than members of the white majority who are burdened by an affirma-
tive action program. If there is any justification for this differential
treatment, it must be based on the belief that there is something spe-
cial about racial affirmative action classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause that warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. But as
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes, the value judg-
ments entailed in adopting an affirmative action program are more
amenable to legislative balancing in the representative political proc-
ess than to politically unaccountable judicial balancing in the guise of
interpreting the words "equal protection." For better or worse, ju-
dicial review is now understood to authorize the Court to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause. However, because of the complex and in-
tractable policy judgments at issue, the substantive content of the
Equal Protection Clause can defensibly be derived only from the rep-
resentative political process. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
itself provide any non-political definition of "equality," or any judi-
cially manageable standards for deriving such a definition.
My claim that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional compe-
tence to formulate racial policy under the Equal Protection Clause is
borne out by the history of Supreme Court adjudications in race
cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated "affirmative ac-
tion" programs that the majoritarian branches of government have
adopted to advance the interests of racial minorities, even though
there is no apparent reason for the Court to have done so. Dred Scotg'
provides the most obvious example. In an effort to provide a legisla-
tive solution to the increasingly contentious issue of slavery in new
United States Territories, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise
Act of 1854. The Supreme Court, however, invalidated that political
compromise in Dred Scott, and in the process, held that blacks were
19 Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (applying
minimal equal protection scrutiny to a rule prohibiting the employment of even qualified
methadone users), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27 (applying strict equal protection scrutiny to
a minority set-aside program adopted by Congress for federally-funded construction projects).
20 Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White, J., dissenting) ("Heroin addiction is a special problem
of the poor, and the addict population is composed largely of racial minorities.... .").
21 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating a congressional statute
prohibiting the holding of slaves in the territory of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36 deg. 30
min. north latitude).
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not "citizens" within the meaning of the United States Constitution.
By so constitutionalizing the inferior status of blacks, the Court pre-
cluded the possibility of future political solutions to the problem of
slavery. Because it left opponents of slavery with no other political
recourse, Dred Scott is now widely viewed as a disastrous decision that
both precipitated the Civil War, and created the need for the Recon-
struction Amendments to the Constitution.3
If there is a lesson in Dred Scott about the perils inherent in the po-
litically unaccountable judicial formulation of racial policy, the Su-
preme Court has not yet learned it. The Court has continued to in-
validate affirmative action programs adopted by the political
branches whenever those programs do not comport with the Court's
own conception of sound racial policy. The Court invalidated an af-
firmative action program for minority medical students in its 1978
Bakke decision 4 and a municipal set-aside plan for minority contrac-
tors in its 1989 Croson decision.25 And it applied what, prior to Grutter,
had always been fatal strict scrutiny to a similar federal set-aside plan
26in its 1995 Adarand decision. Moreover, in its 1993 Shaw v. Reno de-
cision 27 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a North Carolina majority-
minority redistricting plan that had been created to comply with the
federal Voting Rights Act by increasing minority political representa-
tion in Congress. The Court then went on to use Shaw v. Reno as a
basis for invalidating a number of majority-minority redistricting
plans. It invalidated a Georgia plan in its 1995 Miller v. Johnson deci-
sion.8 It invalidated the Shaw v. Reno North Carolina plan after re-
mand in its 1996 Shaw v. Hunt decision, 9 and invalidated a Texas
plan in its 1996 Bush v. Vera decision.30 The Court also invalidated a
Justice Department directive to create an additional Georgia majority-
minority district in its 1997 Abrams v. Johnson decision.3 '
Although Brown v. Board of Education3 2 is typically said to establish
the Supreme Court's capacity to remedy racial oppression, even
Brown does more to illustrate the problems entailed in Supreme
2 See id. at 404-27 (holding that blacks were not included in the constitutional term "citi-
zens").
23 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 429-33 (discussing Dred Scott and its aftermath).
24 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995).
27 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
28 Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
30 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
31 Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
32 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (Brown 1) (invalidating separate-but-
equal public school segregation); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown
I) (requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed").
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Court racial policymaking than it does to answer them. Brown is said
to have desegregated the public schools, and to have ended the gov-
ernment's use of racial classifications. But Brown did neither. The
limited school desegregation that did occur was largely the result of
actions taken by the political branches.s3 And, as the racial profiling
that has followed the September 11 terrorist attacks so clearly illus-
trates, Brown hardly ended the government's use of racial classifica-
tions. 3
4
This is not to say that the Supreme Court always rules against ra-
cial minority interests. The Court upheld voluntary affirmative action
plans in its 1980 Fullilove decision, s5 and its 1990 Metro Broadcasting
decision -although Metro Broadcasting was overruled by the Court
five years later in Adarand.s7 The Court also rejected yet another chal-
lenge to a North Carolina majority-minority redistricting plan in its
2001 Easley v. Cromartie decision,8 finding that the plan was motivated
by political rather than racial considerations. 9 The problem is not
that the Supreme Court always invalidates affirmative action pro-
grams. Rather, the problem is that the Court thinks it can tell the dif-
ference between an affirmative action program that is constitutional
and one that is unconstitutional.
53 See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 104-10 (discussing failure of Brown to de-
segregate schools or end governmental use of racial classifications).
34 For examples of commentators noting the similarity between post-September 11 racial
profiling and the treatment of Japanese American citizens during World War II, see Plight of the
Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1930-39 (2002) and
Liam Braber, Note, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September I 1th Analysis of Race and National Security,
47 VILL. L. REV. 451 (2002). See alsoJerry Rang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9
ASIAN L.J. 195, 197-200 (2002) (discussing how to apply lessons from the Japanese internment
to racial profiling post-September 11); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 23, 33-39 (2002) (arguing that the September 11 attacks have begun to warp the bal-
ance between national security and civil liberties, as did World War II); Lori Sachs, Comment,
September 11, 2001: The Constitution During Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1715,
1728-43 (2002) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in World War II); Huong Vu, Note,
Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 665-76,
691-93 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. Government and mainstream society have been willing to
scapegoat racial minorities after national tragedies); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice:
Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2825-30,
2836-41 (2002) (arguing that modern terrorism legislation repeats the American habit of tar-
geting and stigmatizing immigrant groups and racial minorities).
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
36 Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
37 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 225-27 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad-
casting's use of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny).
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
39 See id. at 257-58 (reversing the lower court's finding of racial motivation). For a fuller
discussion of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions, see GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE
LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
REMEDIES (2000) [hereinafter THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION].
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Any affirmative action program that the white majority voluntarily
adopts through the political process should be upheld under the
Constitution because there is no reason to distrust the political proc-
ess with respect to benign affirmative action. But that is precisely the
argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Adarand, holding that
even benign affirmative action was subject to strict equal protection
scrutiny.40 The value judgments that are entailed in deciding whether
affirmative action constitutes sound social policy are far too subtle
and delicate to be entrusted to an institution whose credentials for
racial prudence and sensitivity include Dred Scott,41 Plessy,42 and Kore-
matsu. That is a recipe for permitting the racial policy of the nation
to be determined not merely by the values of nine unaccountable
people in black robes, but often by the policy preferences of one Jus-
tice who happens at any particular point in time to have the swing
vote on the issue of affirmative action." Allowing the Supreme Court
to have the final say in the formulation of the nation's affirmative ac-
tion policy raises the danger that racial minority rights will continue
to be sacrificed in the name of racial equality, as they have been so
sacrificed during most of the nation's history.45 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's racial balance decision in Grutter illustrates this
problem.
B. Racial Balance
Grutter tends to be viewed as a case that is beneficial to racial mi-
norities because it upholds the use of racial affirmative action in an
educational context, and holds that diversity can constitute a compel-
40 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (citing
Adarand to support the position that benign affirmative action is subject to strict scrutiny).
41 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 397 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution).
42 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segregation).
43 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclu-
sion order directed at persons ofJapanese ancestry).
Many contemporary Supreme Court affirmative action cases have been 5-4 decisions, with
Justice O'Connor acting as the swing vote. See THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39,
at 159-61 (discussing affirmative action voting blocs on the Supreme Court). Indeed, the rea-
son that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter
was that Justice O'Connor, for the first time, switched sides and voted in favor of upholding a
racial affirmative action program on the merits. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; see also THE LAW OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enumerating the affirmative action voting re-
cord ofJustice O'Connor).
45 For an extended argument that the social function of the Supreme Court has historically
been to subordinate the interests of racial minorities to the interests of the white majority see
RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7.
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ling state interest for purposes of strict scrutiny.46 However, Grutter is
likely to do more harm than good for minority interests, because it
emphatically insists that the pursuit of racial balance as P art of an af-
firmative action program is "patently unconstitutional." By outlaw-
ing the pursuit of racial balance in the name of colorblind race neu-
trality, Grutter prohibits the only remedy that is likely to be effective in
combating contemporary racial discrimination.
Grutter evidences a clear Supreme Court preference for race-neu-
tral over race-conscious efforts to ameliorate the plight of racial mi-
norities. Race-neutral affirmative action is subject to only rational ba-
sis review, but race-conscious affirmative action is subject to strict
equal protection scrutiny." Although the economic, political, and so-
cial disadvantages suffered by contemporary racial minorities are
traceable to a long history of race-conscious discrimination, the Su-
preme Court believes that its asymmetrical preference for race-
neutral responses to race-conscious discrimination is justified by the
need to prevent future race-based discrimination.4 9 As a result, the
Court has largely limited the use of race-conscious remedies to those
instances in which race-neutral remedies have been shown to be in-
adequate .o
The Court's preference for race-neutrality has caused it to be hos-
tile to racial quotas and other efforts to achieve racial balance. 51 The
Court views the pursuit of racial balance as an effort to remedy what
it terms general "societal discrimination., 5' According to the Court,
the problem with attempting to remedy societal discrimination is that
it will necessarily result in vast remedial programs that impose im-
permissible burdens on innocent contemporary whites, who were not
themselves the perpetrators of the long history of discrimination
against racial minorities.5' Therefore, the Court has consistently lim-
ited the use of race-conscious affirmative action to situations in which
46 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33 ("Today we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body.")
47 Id. at 308.
48 See id. at 326-27 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign affirmative action); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a benign affirma-
tive action program).
49 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-30 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign racial classifica-
tions in order to protect the individual right to be free from racial discrimination).
50 See id. at 237-38 (suggesting that strict scrutiny requires lack of race-neutral alternatives);
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (rejecting affirmative action pro-
gram because, inter alia, there was no evidence that the city council had considered race neu-
tral alternatives). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (stating that narrow tailoring does not neces-
sarily require lack of race-neutral alternatives).
51 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (finding the pursuit of racial balance to be "patently unconsti-
tutional").
52 See id. at 323 (prohibiting remedies for general "societal discrimination").
53 Id. at 323 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)).
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narrowly-tailored remedies are used to address particularized acts of
discrimination.54
There are two problems with the Supreme Court's aversion to the
pursuit of racial balance as a remedy for general societal discrimina-
tion. First, the argument is internally inconsistent in its effort to dis-
tinguish between individual and group injuries. Second, the argu-
ment is based on a faulty understanding of the nature of
contemporary racial discrimination. Once those two problems are
recognized, only a desire to discount the interests of racial minorities
can justify continued Supreme Court hostility to the goal of achieving
racial balance.
The Supreme Court's view is that racial balance remedies for gen-
eral societal discrimination are unconstitutional because they impose
excessive burdens on whites. 5' In its unadorned version, that argu-
ment is discriminatory on its face. For most of the nation's history,
racial imbalance was perfectly constitutional when it was used to
benefit whites, but racial balance is now unconstitutional when it is
used to benefit racial minorities in an effort to equalize matters. The
Supreme Court has attempted to sidestep this facial discrimination by
embellishing its racial balance prohibition. It argues that the Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals and not groups.56 Therefore,
Justice Powell articulated this position in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10, and reasserted it in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-79 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Led
byJustice O'Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority of the Court. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 323 (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination); id. at 330
(rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional"); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
.an interest in remedying societal discrimination cannot be considered compelling"); Croson,
488 U.S. at 496-98 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stating "'societal discrimination' ... is an
inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications"); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
647-53 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting societal discrimination);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("'[S]ocietal' discrimination, that is, dis-
crimination not traceable to [an agency's] own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compel-
ling to pass constitutional muster.... ."). In Grutter, a majority of the Supreme Court for the
first time held that promoting prospective racial diversity in an educational context could con-
stitute a compelling governmental interest, but the Court reaffirmed its prohibition on the use
of racial balance to remedy general societal discrimination. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
55 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310) (noting that remedying societal
discrimination risks "placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 'who bear no re-
sponsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought
to have suffered.'").
56 See id. at 323 (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards individual rights
rather than group rights). There has been a longstanding debate concerning whether the
Equal Protection Clause is properly understood as protecting individual rights or group rights.
Compare Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently dis-
crimination remedies, should be viewed as individual phenomena) and Michael J. Perry, The
Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HAsTINGS L.J. 1133, 1145-48 (1981) ("[T]he group-centered con-
ception creates [tension] with our individual-centered constitutional jurisprudence"), with
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the Equal Protection Clause permits only remedies for particularized
acts of discrimination, and not for the systemic societal discrimina-
tion to which racial balance remedies are directed. The premise of
this argument is, of course, wrong. As has been noted, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted specifi-
cally to authorize legislative remedies for discrimination against the
group of newly freed black slaves, and legislative remedies are by their
nature group remedies.
In addition to its faulty premise, the Supreme Court's racial bal-
ance prohibition is also internally inconsistent. It first assumes that
the burdens imposed on whites as a result of affirmative action are
individual injuries, and that they can therefore be redressed without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. It then assumes that the bur-
dens imposed on racial minorities as a result of societal discrimina-
tion are group injuries, and that they cannot therefore be redressed
without violating the Equal Protection Clause. However, the two in-
juries are precisely the same. Both result from a determination made
by a governmental institution to sacrifice the interests of one racial
group in order to advance the interests of another racial group. And
whatever it is about the injury to whites that makes racial balance
remedies unconstitutional would certainly seem to apply to the injury
to racial minorities that results from the refusal to allow racial bal-
ance remedies. The only difference between the two is the race of
the group that is being harmed. And despite the Supreme Court's
contrary suggestion, it simply cannot be true that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause permits the continued sacrifice of racial minority interests
in order to advance the interests of whites.
Aside from being logically problematic, the Supreme Court's pro-
hibition on the use of racial balance to remedy general societal dis-
crimination is based on a misunderstanding of the manner in which
contemporary racial discrimination operates. The Court reads the
Equal Protection Clause as something that is addressed to particular-
ized injuries resulting from identifiable acts of invidious racial dis-
crimination. Although such particularized discrimination of course
continues to exist, the truly troubling aspect of contemporary racial
discrimination is statistical in nature. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger 9 -in which the Supreme Court invali-
dated the University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 147-77 (1976)
(arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as
group phenomena).
57 See cases cited supra note 54.
58 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
59 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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program despite upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program the same day in Grutter -- offers a striking statistical demon-
stration of the ways in which racial minorities continue to be under-
represented in the allocation of significant societal resources.6' Be-
cause the criteria that we use to distribute societal resources have
been shaped by centuries of racial prejudice, it is not surprising that
those criteria continue systematically to disadvantage racial minorities
in ways that benefit the white majority. From standardized tests, to
union memberships, to housing patterns, to voting districts, our re-
source allocation criteria continue to reflect the racial attitudes that
have been firmly internalized by the culture at large. Moreover, the
racial skews embedded in those criteria now often operate in ways
62that are largely unconscious. As a result, mere conscious efforts to
guard against our unconscious prejudices are likely to be ineffective
safeguards in most cases. All of this suggests that only dedicated ef-
forts to achieve racial balance are likely to neutralize the culture's
natural propensity to allocate resources in a racially discriminatory
way. To the extent that the Supreme Court holds such racial balance
efforts to be unconstitutional, the Court is reading the Constitution
to require continued discrimination in the allocation of resources.
The Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing, and its con-
comitant indifference to general societal discrimination, seem to re-
flect a belief that prospective race neutrality is largely adequate to sat-
isfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. However, that
belief reduces the concept of racial equality to a theoretical abstrac-
tion having very little to do with the concrete discrimination that con-
tinues to disadvantage racial minorities in everyday life. If you are
not a member of a racial minority group, and you doubt the severity
of the societal disadvantages that racial minorities are forced to en-
dure in contemporary culture, ask yourself whether you would be
willing to give up your white majority status and become a member of
a racial minority group. Similarly, if you are inclined to oppose af-
firmative action because you believe that racial minorities are unfairly
advantaged by racial preferences, ask yourself whether you would be
60 539 U.S. at 306.
61 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-300 nn.1-3 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
62 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. RE%,. 317, 318-44 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimi-
nation is unconscious).
63 This view is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision upholding California's Proposition 209, which explicitly prohibited
race and gender affirmative action for the purpose of promoting prospective race and gender
neutrality. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) ("As a matter of 'conventional' equal protection analysis, there is sim-
ply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional."); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition
209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187 (1997) (discussing Proposition 209 litigation further).
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willing to give up your white majority status in order to take advan-
tage of a racial affirmative action program. I predict that you would
not be willing to relinquish your white majority status-precisely be-
cause you understand, with every fiber of your being, that the culture
continues to discriminate against racial minorities in a myriad of sub-
de yet pervasive ways.
The policy issues surrounding the use of affirmative action to help
eliminate the racial underclass that has always been present in the
United States are obviously quite complicated. The notion that the
Supreme Court could eliminate the normative complexities entailed
in the affirmative action debate simply by insisting on a prospective
commitment to colorblind race neutrality is at best sophomoric.
Once one recognizes the problems inherent in both the Supreme
Court's prohibition on racial balance and its aversion to remedies for
general societal discrimination, it is difficult to find a normatively de-
fensible justification for the Court's position. It seems obvious that
the Court lacks the relative institutional competence to substitute its
policy preferences for the preferences of the political branches of
government when the political branches decide to adopt affirmative
action programs that promote racial balance. It is almost as if the
Supreme Court were intent on reprising the racial callousness of
cases like Dred Scott, Plessy,65 and Koremnatsu,66 so that it could continue
to discount the interests of racial minorities for the benefit of the
white majority.
67
II. CREATIVE COMPLIANCE
The meaning of an imprecise constitutional term such as "equal
protection" is obviously contestable. That raises the question of how
one should properly respond when one disagrees with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision. The position of
the Supreme Court on this issue is clear. In Cooper v. Aaron,8 the
Court announced that it has the final say over the meaning of the
Constitution.69 But, since the Court's assertion is itself an interpreta-
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 397 (1857) (holding that blacks could not
be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution).
65 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segrega-
tion).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military ex-
clusion order directed atJapanese-American citizens).
67 This conclusion is the primary thesis of RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7.
68 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 18 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). The Cooper
Court stated that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a per-
manent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
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tion of the Constitution, Cooper simply generates a self-referential
paradox that is utterly unhelpful. If one believes that the meaning of
a constitutional provision is delegated by the Constitution to the po-
litical branches of government, then Cooper is not only wrong, but po-
litical deference to Cooperwould itself be unconstitutional, as it would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers by vesting policymaking
power in the wrong branch of government. Arguably, the uncertainty
that exists concerning which branch of government possesses ulti-
mate expository power under the Constitution is a good thing. It may
prompt continuous inter-branch negotiations over contentious issues
of social policy in a way that facilitates proper operation of our system
of checks and balances.7° If one shares that view, one is likely to favor
"creative compliance" with the Court's prohibition on racial balanc-
ing. Creative compliance will enable the political branches to secure
some of the benefits of racial balance, through the use of proxies and
camouflage techniques, without directly confronting the Supreme
Court's assertion of power over the political branches through the in-
stitution ofjudicial review. The use of proxies and camouflage by the
representative branches will also provide feedback to the Court con-
cerning the political viability of its constitutional pronouncements,
thereby enabling the Court to factor that feedback into its future con-
stitutional expositions.
A. Proxies
The most obvious way in which the political branches of govern-
ment could comply with the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial
balancing, while still seeking to secure at least some of the benefits of
racial balance, is to implement affirmative action plans that use race-
neutral factors as proxies for race. This strategy seems ironically ap-
propriate because much of the contemporary racial discrimination
that affirmative action is designed to counteract also operates
through the use of proxies. In the past, American culture used ex-
plicit racial discrimination to exclude racial minorities from U.S. soil,
from desirable education, from desirable employment, from desir-
able housing, and from exercising political power. Minorities were
barred from immigrating to the United States' and from holding cer-
70 This, in part, is the thesis of a book by Louis Michael Seidman about judicial review. See
LOuis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETrLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001) (arguing against any final judicial resolution
of open constitutional questions).
71 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509-10 (2d ed. 1985) (dis-
cussing the Chinese Exclusion laws which prohibited the immigration and re-immigration of
Chinese persons and included the 1902 statute which permanently banned Chinese entry).
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talnjobs. Minorities were prohibited from being educated, or were• ~74 ..
educated in segregated schools. They were prohibited from living
in certain neighborhoods75 and from voting. 6 As the statistics cited in
Justice Ginsburg's Gratz dissent illustrate, American culture still dis-
criminates against racial minorities in many areas." However, in the
post civil rights era where the option of de jure racial discrimination
78has been restricted, de facto racial discrimination tends to be im-
plemented through the use of proxies that correlate with race. Con-
temporary minorities are kept out of predominantly white schools
7 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free" Free Blacks in
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 43 (1991) (discussing Virginia
laws that effectively prevented blacks from practicing professions such as teaching and law by
forbidding free blacks to congregate); Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here?: How the
Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 13-15 (2004) (discussing statutory and regu-
latory restrictions that prohibited blacks from practicing law, and from becoming plumbers and
barbers).
73 See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 561-
66 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (discussing legal prohibitions on educating slaves as demon-
strated by laws outlawing the sale of writing materials to slaves and the Catholic Church's his-
torical denial of the scriptures to the "ignorant and impressionable").
74 See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doc-
trine used to justify segregation in public schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed").
75 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1948) (reversing state court enforcement
of racially restrictive covenant in the sale of residential real property); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (reversing state court enforcement of laws requiring residential racial segre-
gation).
76 For example, the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted in
1870 to eliminate the widespread disenfranchisement of blacks that existed prior to the Civil
War. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (holding that the right to vote cannot be abridged on account
of race). Even after adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, however, blacks were effectively
disenfranchised in many states by devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and voting districts
which diluted minority voting strength. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to address
this de facto disenfranchisement. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-53 (1992) (discuss-
ing the purposes and history of the Voting Rights Act, and attempts over the years to thwart
these purposes).
77 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
statistical disadvantages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in areas including edu-
cation, employment, and housing); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (noting that Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress
until 1972, seven years after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan
adopted in response to the 1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to
Congress since the Reconstruction).
78 In overruling the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
Brown I is typically understood to have prohibited most governmental uses of racial classifica-
tions. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-96 (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in public
schools). However, the race-based actions that have been taken in the government's post-
September 11 war on terrorism illustrate that some racial classifications are still permitted. See
supra note 34 (citing articles that discuss similarities between present race-based security meas-
ures and race-based Japanese internment during World War 1I).
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through the use of district lines and standardized test scores. 79 Mi-
norities are kept out of predominantly white jobs through the use of
standardized test scores and subjective employment standards.8 0  Mi-
norities are kept out of predominantly white neighborhoods through
the use of zoning restrictions."' Finally, minorities are kept out of
predominantly white legislatures through the use of gerrymandered
voting districts. 2 Accordingly, the use of racial proxies to remedy ra-
cial imbalance that itself results from the use of racial proxies seems
congruent enough to constitute a form of poetic justice.
Due to a history of pervasive discrimination against racial minori-
ties, racial minorities are an economically disadvantaged class.83 That
means that economic disadvantage can now often be used as a proxy
for race in affirmative action programs. Although affirmative action
initiatives based on economic disadvantage will be facially neutral,
they will still have a disproportionately beneficial impact on racial
minorities because racial minorities are overrepresented among
those who suffer economic disadvantage. The Supreme Court is
likely to view economic affirmative action as constitutionally per-
missible precisely because it appears to be facially neutral.
84
79 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 366-71 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that law schools could increase diversity by abandoning racially-correlated selection criteria
such as the LSAT); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
interdistrict judicial remedies for school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to
remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
80 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvan-
,tages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of employment); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (explaining why percentile disparities in em-
ployment do not necessarily make out a prima facie case of discrimination and adopting strin-
gent standards under Title VII for proof of discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238-48 (1976) (holding that any racially disparate impact resulting from the use of standard-
ized tests in the employment context does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in the ab-
sence of intentional discrimination).
81 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71
(1977) (rejecting claim that residential zoning restriction was racially discriminatory without
any proof that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-508 (1975) (holding that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge zoning ordi-
nance as racially discriminatory without additional evidence of personal impact caused by the
ordinance).
82 See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (noting that
Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress until 1972, seven years after the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan adopted in response to the
1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to Congress since the Recon-
struction).
83 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvan-
tages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of wealth and income).
84 Indeed, the Court at times seems to invite the use of economic affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peia, 515 U.S. 200, 212-13, 223-24 (1995) (upholding affirma-
tive action for contractors who are socially and economically disadvantaged, but applying strict
scrutiny to statutory presumption that racial minorities are so disadvantaged).
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In a strict doctrinal sense, the use of economic disadvantage as a
proxy for racial disadvantage should not work. The Supreme Court's
decision in Washington v. Davis85 seems clearly to focus on discrimi-
natory intent as the factor that establishes an equal protection viola-
tion.8, As a result, the intent to promote racial balance through the
use of a racial proxy would initially seem to be identical to-and just
as unconstitutional as-the intent to pursue racial balance explicitly.
However, if the Supreme Court were to delve that deeply into the in-
tent of executive or legislative policymakers, even when those policy-
makers used classifications that were race-neutral on their face, the
Court would be analytically required to delve just as deeply into the
intent lying beneath all of the facially neutral classifications that
American culture presently uses to disadvantage racial minorities with
respect to education, employment, housing, and political power."'
And that, of course, is something that the Court seems unwilling to
do because of its disruptive effect on the current allocation of re-
88sources.
It is also possible to design affirmative action programs that pro-
mote racial balance by using proxies that have a higher correlation
with race than does mere economic disadvantage. For example,
things like demonstrated ability to overcome hardship and demon-
strated commitment to social justice might be useful proxies for race,
if one believes that racial minorities are particularly likely to possess
those qualities. The racial correlation of such proxies can be further
increased by focusing on factors such as the use of English as a sec-
ond language, or membership in a family having an incarcerated
parent. s9 Once again, those sorts of proxies are likely to be useful in
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See id. at 238-48 (holding that programs based on disadvantage, not race, are subject to
relaxed judicial scrutiny, as opposed to racial classifications which mandate strict judicial scru-
tiny directed at governmental intent).
87 It is, of course, possible that the Court would find the presence of unconstitutional intent
in a facially neutral affirmative action program, but not in a facially neutral classification that
was intended to promote societal discrimination-even though the two were analytically analo-
gous. Such a tacit distinction may have been what actually motivated the Court's decision in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), where the Court distinguished between
unconstitutional actuating intent and constitutionally permissible incidental intent. See id. at
278-80 (distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and mere awareness of racially dispa-
rate impact). Although Feeney involved allegations of gender discrimination, its elaboration of
the intent requirement is equally applicable to cases of racial discrimination. See id. at 272-73
(discussing racial discrimination as prototype).
8 See, e.g., id. at 278-80 (upholding arguably discriminatory intent that was found to be
merely incidental).
89 See, e.g., Kim Ford-Mazuri, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action,
88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2332-37 (2000) (stating that some schools promote diversity by considering
essays in which applicants discuss past difficulties and hardships that tend to affect racial mi-
norities).
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advancing racial balance objectives because they correlate highly with
race. The correlation can be increased even more by focusing on fac-
tors such as an individual's experience with overt racial discrimina-
tion; an individual's ability to offer perspectives that are typically miss-
ing from predominantly white institutions; and the likelihood that an
individual will provide resources to minority communities.90 As the
racial proxy becomes more transparent, however, the Supreme Court
may be more likely to view its use as an unconstitutional effort to pro-
mote racial balance. 9'
One racial proxy that has ironically gained popularity even among
moderate conservatives is the class rank proxy. Rather than relying
on overt racial affirmative action in educational contexts, class rank
plans automatically admit to state colleges any high school student
who graduates in the top X percent of his or her class. The specified
percentages tend to range from the top 4% to the top 20% of gradu-
ating classes. 92 To the extent that class rank and X-percent proxies
are appealing, it is because they are facially neutral. However, such
programs can promote racial balance only in states where high
schools are racially segregated to begin with.9
One of the most noticeable recent uses of racial proxies has been
in the context of voter redistricting. After the 1990 Census created
new congressional seats in states whose past voting discrimination
made them subject to the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights
Act, the Supreme Court began a campaign to oversee the racial poli-
tics of congressional redistricting. In Shaw v. Reno,94 the Court held
that the intentional creation of voting districts in which a majority of
the voters were racial minorities was unconstitutional.5 Racial major-
ity-minority voting districts are a useful way of promoting racial bal-
90 See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH.
J. RACE & LAW 1, 7-10 (2001) (arguing that admissions preferences should be granted on the
basis of such factors).
91 Cf Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (refusing to dismiss a constitu-
tional challenge to a new facially-neutral voting district for the City of Tuskegee, Alabama,
where the shape of the district had been changed from a square to "a strangely irregular twenty-
eight-sided figure" that excluded virtually all black voters); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886) (invalidating a conviction for violating a facially-neutral ordinance that required
laundries to be housed in stone or brick buildings, where virtually all who were denied exemp-
tions were Chinese).
92 See Roithmayr, supra note 90, at 10-14 (discussing class rank programs and their mixed
success in aiding racial minorities).
93 See id. at 13 (discussing dependence of class rank plans on segregated nature of high
schools).
94 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
95 See id. at 641-49 (applying strict scrutiny to voting district whose shape was so bizarre that
it could only be explained by racial motivation); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to voting districts where race was a "predominant factor" in
drawing district lines).
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ance because they increase the amount of representation that racial
minorities are able to secure in Congress. When minority voters are
concentrated in minority dominated voting districts, they have a
greater chance of electing a representative who is responsive to their
interests than when minority voters are dispersed throughout white
dominated voting districts.
After having had to resolve a series of cases during the 1990s in
which the Court had to decide whether race had been given too
much weight in drawing district lines, the Court ultimately signaled a
retreat from this unwieldy issue. In Easley v. Cromartie,96 the Court
upheld a gerrymandered voting district with a high concentration of
minority voters on the ground that race had not been used for its
own sake, but rather had been used as a proxy for political party af-
filiation. 97 Accordingly, the Supreme Court now seems to have en-
dorsed the constitutionality of at least this proxy for racial balance,
and it has done so despite the relative transparency of the proxy.
Proxies can mitigate the harshness of the Supreme Court's prohi-
bition on racial balancing. However, they still permit the Supreme
Court to have the final say over the constitutionality of racial policies
that the representative branches seek to implement through use of a
proxy. That suggests that the more effective a racial proxy is in pro-
moting meaningful racial balance, the more likely the Supreme
Court is to invalidate it as a veiled attempt to sidestep the Court's own
racial policy preferences. Perhaps more surreptitious measures are
therefore appropriate.
B. Camouflage
A second way in which the political branches could try to dilute
the force of the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing is
by attempting to camouflage whatever racial balance policies they
choose to adopt. Grutter contains the Court's most recent articulation
of its longstanding view that the pursuit of racial balance is constitu-
tionally impermissible.9 s However, Grutter itself can be read to sup-
port the proposition that well-camouflaged racial balancing is consti-
tutionally permissible. When Grutter is compared to Gratz,9 it appears
that the Court chose to uphold the affirmative action program that
was more closely connected to racial balance, and to invalidate the
96 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
97 See id. at 257-58 (permitting political party affiliation to be used as a proxy for race in the
redistricting context).
98 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (rejecting racial balancing as "patently un-
constitutional").
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating the racial affirmative action pro-
gram at the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and Arts).
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program that was less likely to advance that goal. This suggests that
the Supreme Court may ultimately be more interested in form than
in substance with respect to the issue of racial balance.
Grutter upheld the constitutionality of the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action program. °° The Court held that the
Law School had a compelling interest in diversity, which was suffi-
cient to survive the strict equal protection scrutiny that applied to the
school's use of a racial preference for minority students in the admis-
sions process.01 The Court also held that the use of a racial "plus"
factor, rather than a numerical quota, was a narrowly tailored way to
advance the school's interest in diversity, and that it satisfied the
equal protection demand that each applicant be given particularized
consideration.102 The Court stressed that such a holistic consideration
helped ensure that each applicant would be treated as an individual
rather than merely as a member of a racial group.
1 0 3
On the same day that Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gratz invalidated the University of Michigan's under-
graduate affirmative action program. 4 Although the goal of increas-
ing student diversity remained compelling,00 the undergraduate af-
firmative action program was too mechanical to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. 106 Because the
undergraduate program automatically awarded a large fixed number
of points to each minority applicant, it had "the effect of making 'the
factor of race.., decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified un-
derrepresented minority applicant."'17 The failure to use a more par-
ticularized selection process, therefore, made the undergraduate
program unconstitutional.0 s
Despite the holistic and particularized consideration that the Su-
preme Court found to be constitutionally essential in Grutter, the Law
School affirmative action program that the Grutter Court upheld ap-
pears to have been implemented in a way that was designed to pro-
mote racial balance. As Chief Justice Rehnquist convincingly demon-
strated in his Grutter dissent, the percentages of various racial minor-
ity groups admitted under the Law School program closely reflected
100 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-40 (upholding a law school affirmative action program that
gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants).
101 Id. at 328-29.
102 Id. at 333-41.
103 Id. at 337.
104 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
105 Id. at 268.
106 Id. at 270-74.
107 Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)) (ellip-
sis in original).
108 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
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the percentages of those same minority groups in the overall Law
School applicant pool.'09 A majority of the admitted minority stu-
dents were black; half of that number were Latino; and one-sixth of
that initial number were indigenous Indians. The Law School de-
fended its program on the ground that it sought to ensure the admis-
sion of a "critical mass" of students from each relevant minority
group, thereby enabling a meaningful exchange of ideas and per-
spectives among students. However, the low number of Indian stu-
dents admitted under the program was much too small to constitute a
critical mass. That further supported the conclusion that racial bal-
ance was the actual motive of the Law School program.l10
Although the undergraduate program was invalidated in Gratz on
the grounds that it mechanically awarded a fixed number of points to
each underrepresented minority applicant,"' there is nothing inher-
ent in the award of a fixed number of points that would necessarily re-
flect racial balance. Indeed, if the school were primarily interested in
racial balance, it might well prefer a program that awarded a variable
number of points to racial minority group applicants. A variable
point program would enable the school to regulate the number of
points awarded for membership in various minority groups in a way
that enabled the school to achieve more directly whatever racial bal-
ance it desired.
What emerges from a comparison of Grutter and Gratz is the pos-
sibility that an appropriate degree of camouflage will permit the pur-
suit of racial balance. The arguments made by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent were cogent enough that the Grutter
majority could not have simply overlooked them. Rather, the major-
ity must have concluded that the Law School program deserved to be
upheld despite that danger that it was motivated by a desire to pro-
mote racial balance. Perhaps, the Court preferred the Grutter pro-
gram to the Gratz program because the fixed numerical bonus in
Gratz simply looked more like a racial quota than the nominally more
particularized racial "plus" in the Grutter holistic program. If that is
true, the Supreme Court may be more concerned with the appear-
ance of affirmative action programs than with their actual effect. As
long as a program appears to be more consistent with liberal concep-
tions of individual merit than with group-based conceptions of racial
balance, the Court may be willing to uphold the program.
109 Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 381-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110 Id.; see also id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Michigan Law School admissions program was really designed to achieve racial bal-
ance); id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the concept of critical mass is a de-
lusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most in-
stances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.").
I Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
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The Court's treatment of the racial redistricting cases supports the
theory that form can be more important than substance in the equal
protection context. As has been noted, after invalidating a number
of majority-minority voting districts during the 1990s on the grounds
that they were predominantly motivated by racial considerations, the
Court upheld what appears to be an analytically indistinguishable ma-
jority-minority district on the grounds that it was motivated primarily
by political rather than racial considerations."2 To the extent that the
Court was willing to relax its opposition to majority-minority voting
districts because it came to view the policy issues that were involved as
essentially political in nature, the Court might be willing to do the
same thing with respect to racial balance. Because a decision by the
political branches to pursue racial balance is also essentially political
in nature, the Court might drop its opposition to such racial balance
if it finds enough camouflage to permit it to do so.
There is an interesting irony in the suggestion that racial balance
might become constitutionally permissible if it is adequately hidden
from view. In order to ensure that an affirmative action program is
not viewed as a program that is facially about racial balance, the pro-
gram will have to be implemented in a way that ensures that racial
correlations do not become too high. If a program continually ad-
mitted percentages of racial minorities that correlated with the per-
centages of racial minorities in the relevant population, the program
would be easily recognized as a veiled racial balance program. Rather
than use fixed racial quotas, therefore, a program will have to use
floating quotas to ensure that the relevant minority percentages
change periodically.
The need for such floating quotas is ironic for two reasons. First,
the use of a floating quota would require even more consideration of
racial factors than a straight-forward racial balance program. The
program administrators would not only have to ascertain the relevant
racial percentages, as they would with a racial balance program, but
they would then have to monitor the program's performance to make
sure that different racial percentages were produced by the program.
Second, such floating quotas might have to be used even under a
nondiscriminatory program that gave no special consideration to race
at all. In the absence of societal discrimination, one would expect a
nondiscriminatory selection program to reflect the racial minority
percentages that exist in the population at large. If it did not, that
would suggest the presence of discrimination somewhere in the sys-
tem-either in the choice or the application of selection criteria. In
a truly nondiscriminatory program, underrepresentation of racial mi-
112 See supra, text accompanying notes 27-39, 94-97 (discussing gerrymandering and voting
district construction in the context of race).
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norities would be expected only if one believed that racial minorities
were somehow inherently inferior to whites in their ability to satisfy
neutral selection criteria. However, since a truly nondiscriminatory
selection program would have the outward appearance of a racial bal-
ance program, the results of even a nondiscriminatory program
would have to be adjusted to avoid the appearance of racial balance.
Simply stating that argument suggests that there is something seri-
ously wrong with the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance.
Proxies and camouflage might successfully permit the political
branches of government to realize some of the benefits of racial bal-
ance. However, they would not do much to address the more fun-
damental separation of powers problems that result from having the
politically unaccountable Supreme Court formulate racial policy for
the nation. In order to address that problem, more direct measures
may be preferable.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The problem with Grutter is not simply that it holds the pursuit of
racial balance to be unconstitutional. What is fundamentally more
troubling is the claim that judicial review authorizes the Supreme
Court to neutralize political solutions to the persistent problem of ra-
cial discrimination in the United States. I use the term "neutralize"
because the Court claims to be advancing the cause of race neutrality
when it chooses to override racial balance efforts that are adopted by
the representative branches. But as Part II of this Article sought to
demonstrate,1 i3 the concept of neutrality that is used by the Supreme
Court has come to mean merely the continued sacrifice of racial mi-
nority interests in order to advance the interests of the white majority.
Regardless of how one feels about the concept of judicial review in
the abstract, this use of judicial review in the context of affirmative
action seems both invidious and indefensible. The problem that
needs to be neutralized is not the effort that the political branches
make to promote racial balance, but rather the conception ofjudicial
review that the Supreme Court invokes to override such efforts. For-
tunately, there are political strategies that the representative branches
of government can use to resist the Court's discriminatory under-
standing of neutrality. Some strategies can be used in an effort to
persuade the Court to reconsider its own understanding of judicial
review. Other strategies can be used to subvert more directly the
Court's usurpation of racial policymaking power.
113 See supra Part II (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court has, in the name of equal
protection, systematically favored the interests of the white majority over the interests of racial
minorities).
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A. Persuasion
The Supreme Court, of course, responds to politics. It was long
ago observed that the Supreme Court follows the election returns,
and the Court's 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore"l5 has often been cited as
a recent reminder that Supreme Court political preferences can in-
fluence constitutional adjudications in dispositive ways. 1 6 It has even
been suggested that the Court's somewhat surprising decision to up-
hold the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter was heavily in-
fluenced by the amicus briefs that the business community, the mili-
tary, and educational leaders filed in the case." 7 Accordingly, it
makes sense to ask whether there are political actions that can be
taken by the representative branches that might help "convince" the
Court to rethink the intrusiveness with which it exercises judicial re-
view in the context of affirmative action.
One thing that might prompt th6 Supreme Court to reevaluate its
current conception ofjudicial review in the affirmative action context
is vocal opposition from the political branches. Historically, several
United States Presidents have been noteworthy for insisting that the
political branches have as much right as the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson forcefully asserted that the
doctrine of separation of powers did not authorize the Supreme
Court to impose its understanding of the Constitution on the Presi-
dent because each branch of government had an equal right to in-
terpret the Constitution as it applied within that branch's own sphere
of authority."" Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to recharter the Bank of
the United States with a veto message stating that he believed that the
Bank was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's de-
114 See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("[N]o matther whether th'
constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns.").
115 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the manner in which Florida votes should be counted in
the 2000 presidential election).
116 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE
L.J. 1407, 1407 (2001) ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore has
shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court and in the system of judicial
review.").
n7 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our De-
mocratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 117 (2003) (describing Grutter and Gratz as "the latest and
perhaps most significant evidence that race-based affirmative action was at risk until the busi-
ness community, the military brass, and educational leaders rallied in its defense"). I view the
decision as somewhat surprising because it is the first time thatJustice O'Connor-who cast the
decisive vote in favor of upholding the plan at issue-has ever voted to uphold a racial affirma-
tive action plan on the merits. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311-44 (2003) (majority
opinion of O'Connor, J.); THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enu-
merating the affirmative action voting record ofJustice O'Connor).
118 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-20 (14th ed.
2001) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's issuance of pardons for convictions under the Sedition
Act of 1798 even though the courts thought the Act to be constitutional).
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cision in McCulloch v. Mayland 9 upholding the constitutionality of
the Bank.120 President Franklin D. Roosevelt even drafted a speech to
justify his decision to defy an adverse Supreme Court ruling in the
Gold Clause Cases2' if the Court ultimately chose to invalidate the gov-
ernment's abrogation of gold clauses in federal obligations. The
speech was never delivered, however, because the Court's ruling
agreed with the President's reading of the Constitution. 22 All of
these presidential arguments were rooted in the separation-of-powers-
based belief that the Court could not properly interfere with the ac-
tions of a coordinate branch of government when the coordinate
branch was operating within a sphere of power that had been consti-
tutionally delegated to the political branch rather than to the Court.
In that regard, those presidential assertions of autonomous constitu-
tional interpretation are directly relevant to the claim that the Su-
preme Court lacks the authority to interfere with the exercise of any
affirmative action policymaking power that the Constitution has dele-
gated to the political branches.
Perhaps the best known example of apparent Supreme Court def-
erence to political pressure stems from President Franklin D. Roose-
velt's Court-packing plan. Roosevelt threatened to increase the
number of Justices on the Supreme Court in the hope that the plan
would reduce the Supreme Court's opposition to his New Deal efforts
to pull the nation out of the Depression.11 By focusing the nation's
Depression-related frustrations on the Supreme Court, Roosevelt was
able to offer the public a cause for the nation's continued economic
problems. 2 4 In addition, by characterizing his plan as a proposal for
structural reform directed at older Justices likely to pose a threat to
judicial efficiency, Roosevelt was able to concentrate political pres-
sure on the Justices whose attachment to older economic theories
made them most antagonistic to his New Deal agenda.' 5 The ulti-
mate success of the Court-packing plan suggests that the Supreme
Court may respond to political pressure when the pressure is perva-
sive, intense, and threatens a prospective dilution of the Court's pres-
tige and policymaking power. Interestingly, in support of his plan,
119 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
120 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 20-21 (discussing AndrewJackson's veto mes-
sage on the bill to recharter the Bank of United States).
2 See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (permitting the government to abrogate
the gold clauses in federal obligations).
1 See SuLuvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 22 (referencing Franklin D. Roosevelt's pro-
posed gold clause speech).
123 See id. at 135-37 (discussing Roosevelt's Court-packing plan).
24 See id. at 136 (discussing Roosevelt's effort to blame the Supreme Court for delays in eco-
nomic recovery following the Great Depression).
125 See id. (discussing Roosevelt's belief that the Supreme Court needed younger blood).
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President Roosevelt employed rhetoric that emphasized the impor-
tance of preventing the Supreme Court from behaving in an uncon-
stitutional manner:
[W]e have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.
We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the
Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will dojustice under
the Constitution-not over it. 126
A President committed to racial equality could make a series of
analogous political speeches that would rebuke the Supreme Court
for impeding the nation's progress toward racial equality through the
Court's overly intrusive judicial review of affirmative action plans.27
These speeches could emphasize the relative institutional advantages
that the political branches have over the Court in the formulation of
racial policy, especially in light of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 8 but the real point of the speeches would be to send a
political, rather than a doctrinal, message to the Court. The effec-
tiveness of these speeches could be enhanced by echoing three fea-
tures of President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. First, the Presi-
dent could blame the Supreme Court for the nation's persistent
racial problems, emphasizing-with appropriate references to Dred
Scott-that the political branches were trying their best to solve the
problem of racial inequality only to have their efforts stymied by a
Court that was pursuing an outmoded conception of equality in
which whites always end up being more equal than racial minorities.
Second, the President could characterize his initiative as a structural
reform that was intended to reestablish separation-of-powers bounda-
ries by confining the Court to adjudicatory rather than policymaking
activities. Third, the President could highlight the fact that the same
four or five Justices voting as a conservative bloc are the ones who al-
ways vote against affirmative action and racial balance, thereby high-
lighting the political, rather than constitutional, nature of the Court's
opposition to majoritarian remedies for racial discrimination. Even a
conservative President with no particular commitment to racial equal-
ity should favor sending a strong political admonition to the Court,
126 See id. (quoting President Roosevelt's March 9, 1937 radio address to the nation in which
he called for alterations to the Court).
127 In the past, I have criticized President Clinton for his failure to initiate political actions,
such as those proposed here, to recapture racial policymaking power from the Supreme Court.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 469 (2000), available
at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/63LCPSpann ("What President Clinton has failed to do
is to assert the full scope of his constitutional authority to formulate race relations policy for the
nation that elected him to be its political leader.") (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
128 See supra Part L.A (discussing the relative institutional competence of the Court and the
political branches).
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because conservatives typically claim that they favor judicial restraint
and disfavor judicial policymaking under the guise of constitutional
interpretation 9-which is precisely what the Supreme Court does
when it invalidates an affirmative action program that has been
adopted by the political branches.
The President and members of Congress could supplement this
political message to the Court in a number of more concrete ways. A
belief in deferential judicial review for benign affirmative action
could be made a political litmus test for the appointment and confir-
mation of new federal judges, in much the same way that one's posi-
tion on abortion is often used as a litmus test for judicial appoint-
ments.1 30  In addition, Senators could use their filibuster power to
help ensure that federal judges would not be appointed if they op-
posed deference to the political branches on the issue of affirmative
action. 1
3 1
Pursuant to the Article III power of Congress to regulate the juris-
diction of the federal courts, 32 the President and members of Con-
gress could propose legislation that would strip the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts of their jurisdiction to review affirmative ac-
tion programs that were adopted by the representative branches of
government. Politically motivated legislation restricting federal court
jurisdiction has been introduced in the past with respect to a variety
of controversial issues. 33 Although the constitutionality of such legis-
12 For example, in his 2004 State of the Union message, President George W. Bush chastised
activist courts for reading state constitutions to require recognition of same-sex marriages, and
raised the specter of a federal constitutional amendment to reverse those activist decisions. See
State of Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at A18 (quoting Bush as saying, "Activist
judges... have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of the
people and their elected representatives .... Ifjudges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon
the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional. process.") (em-
phasis in original). Bush later went on to endorse the passage of a constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Ban-
ning Gay Marriage: President Says States Could Rule on Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at
Al (quoting Bush as saying, "[a]fter more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and
millennia of human experience, a fewjudges and local authorities are presuming to change the
most fundamental institution of civilization.").
130 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 300 (2004)
(citing the abortion litmus test for federal judges).
131 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardbal 37J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 524-29 (2004) (dis-
cussing the recent filibuster use by Senate Democrats to defeat politically undesirable Republi-
can nominees to the federal judiciary, largely because of the perceived opposition of those
nominees to civil rights).
132 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (granting Congress the power to create inferior federal
courts and to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respectively).
133 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 319-26 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing proposed jurisdiction-stripping legislation
concerning controversial issues such as busing, school prayer, and abortion).
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lation may in some circumstances be uncertain, 34 the point of intro-
ducing jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the affirmative action con-
text would be more for its political effect than to secure its actual
adoption.
More forcefully, the President and members of Congress could
propose constitutional amendments that would not only permit the
pursuit of racial balance in the context of affirmative action, but
would also regulate or eliminate judicial review of majoritarian af-
firmative action. 35 Such an amendment would presumably eliminate
any constitutional difficulties presented by jurisdiction-stripping legis-
lation, but again, the primary motive of introducing such proposed
amendments would be to exert political leverage on the Court. Fi-
nally, the President and members of Congress could propose bills of
impeachment directed at Supreme Court Justices who failed to re-
spond to more subtle political messages and continued to violate
separation-of-powers principles by overriding majoritarian affirmative
action programs. 11 The impeachment of President Clinton estab-
lishes that such politically motivated use of the impeachment process
can occur even for less lofty purposes."'
There are a number of ways in which the political branches can
send political messages to the Supreme Court in the hope of having
the Court relax its intrusion into the politically accountable process
of racial policymaking. I suspect that the Court is likely to be respon-
sive to a set of forcefully conveyed political messages, just as it appears
to have been responsive to such messages in the context of the New
Deal Court-packing plan. However, if the Court does not respond to
political pressure, more subversive actions are possible.
B. Subversion
The Supreme Court can properly expect only the degree of defer-
ence to which it is legitimately entitled. When the Court exceeds the
scope of its own constitutional power by usurping policymaking
power from the representative branches, the system of checks and
balances requires that the representative branches resist the Court's
ultra vires actions to the extent that the Constitution gives the politi-
cal branches the power to do so. If the representative branches can-
13 See id. (discussing the constitutionality ofjurisdiction-stripping legislation).
135 See U.S. CONsT. art. V (establishing the process for amending the Constitution).
136 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Impeachment and Constitutional Structure,
5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 249, 256-58 (2000) (discussing the politically motivated impeachment
efforts directed at Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren and Supreme Court Associate Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas).
137 See id. (discussing the politically motivated impeachment effort directed at President Bill
Clinton).
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not find ways to persuade the Supreme Court to adopt a more defer-
ential approach to judicial review in the context of affirmative action,
the representative branches should find ways to subvert the Court's
efforts to upset the constitutional balance of powers.
The idea that subversion can be a legitimate response to an ille-
gitimate legal order is not a new one.1 38 However, the idea has been
given new vitality by Professor Paul Butler. Butler has argued, for ex-
ample, that jury nullification can constitute an appropriate response
by racial minority jurors to the forms of racial discrimination that are
built into the criminal justice system.13 9 He has also argued that it is
praiseworthy forjudges to circumvent a law that they believe to be im-
moral.'" Butler is careful to limit his support of subversion to ques-
tions of morality, as opposed to mere political disagreements. 141 I am
advocating subversion by the political branches, directed at the man-
ner in which the Supreme Court has exercised judicial review under
the Equal Protection Clause, because I believe the Supreme Court's
actions to be unconstitutional, illegitimate, and immoral. I believe
this because the Supreme Court's racial jurisprudence has a proven
propensity to promote racial injustice. 1
42
Political subversion of Supreme Court decisions can be effective,
as the aftermath of the Brown decisions demonstrates. 143The massive
resistance that followed the Supreme Court's desegregation decision
was successful in delaying any meaningful desegregation of southern
schools for a decade.'" Presumably, that is because the Court so
1 The founding of the United States was premised on the belief that subversion is a legiti-
mate response to an illegitimate legal order. SeeJOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO TI-E UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 6 (3d ed. 2001) (citing THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), declaring that "whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.").
139 Paul Butler, Racially Based Juiy Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995).
140 See Paul Butler, Subversive Judges (Oct. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript delivered at
Georgetown-Sloan Interdisciplinary Workshop, on file with author).
See, e.g., id. at 13 n.36 (stating that "disagreement with the law on public policy grounds-
as opposed to moral grounds-does notjustify subversion").
14 See generally RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 85-169 (discussing the ways in
which the Supreme Court has historically sacrificed racial minority interests to advance the in-
terests of the white majority).
143 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrine in pub-
lic schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) requiring desegregation of public schools
"with all deliberate speed.").
4 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 456-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's response to
massive southern resistance following the Brown decisions). Although I have suggested that the
Supreme Court responds to political pressure, both Brown I and 11 and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18-21 (1958) (insisting on desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas
despite massive resistance), are often cited to illustrate the Supreme Court's capacity forjudicial
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feared the political backlash that followed the issuance of Brown ,145
that it felt compelled to retreat to the "all deliberate speed" formula
of Brown Il. 46 This was a means of delaying implementation of the
Court's desegregation requirement. 1 4  Moreover, the year after Brown
I was decided, the post-Brown threat of massive southern resistance
caused the United States Supreme Court to back down from a politi-
cal confrontation with the Virginia Supreme Court over the issue of
miscegenation. In its infamous Naim v. Naim148 decisions, the Court
refused to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been
defiantly upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, even though Brown I
seemed to have made miscegenation laws clearly unconstitutional. 149
Perhaps similar massive resistance to the Supreme Court's intrusive
judicial review of affirmative action would be similarly successful in
marginalizing Supreme Court efforts to override the affirmative ac-
tion policies adopted by the representative branches. And, of course,
there is something appealingly symmetrical about using the a tech-
nique to promote racial equality that is the same as the technique
independence. However, that characterization is inaccurate. Cooper constituted the only effort
by the Supreme Court to enforce the desegregation mandate of the Brown decisions prior to
1963. Moreover, the bulk of southern school desegregation that followed resulted not from
Supreme Court decisions, but from the political actions of Congress in passing the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the political actions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
enforcing that Act. STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 457-58.
145 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring the district courts to take actions towards desegre-
gation "with all deliberate speed.").
17 See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 455-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's delay in imple-
menting its Brown desegregation requirement).
148 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam).
149 In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam), and 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per cu-
riam), the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold unconstitutional a Virginia miscege-
nation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded for clarification of the re-
cord. 350 U.S. at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its
earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1956) (per
curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or amend the man-
date, finding that the constitutional question had not been "properly presented." This allowed
the Virginia court's decision to remain in effect. 350 U.S. at 985. Because the neutrality prin-
ciple that had been announced in Brown I seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation statute
unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim on the merits also
seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the
case, the Supreme Court's actions in Naim v. Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Ge-
rald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Ju-
dicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that "there are very few dismissals similarly
indefensible in law."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis
in the law."). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute
eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), when only 16 states still had
miscegenation statutes on the books. Id. at 6.
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previously used by southern segregationists to promote racial dis-
crimination.
The political branches can subvert the Supreme Court's illegiti-
mate exercise ofjudicial review in the context of affirmative action by
aggressively utilizing the full scope of the power that the Constitution
grants to the political branches. I have suggested that the political
branches could introduce jurisdiction-stripping legislation, constitu-
tional amendments, and bills of impeachment in an effort to pressure
the Supreme Court into changing its conception of appropriate judi-
cial review. But the political branches need not stop at the mere in-
troduction of such measures. If the Supreme Court does not respond
to political pressure, the political branches also have the constitu-
tional authority to implement those remedies. Congress could actu-
ally pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation that insulated affirmative ac-
tion from judicial review. The states could actually amend the
Constitution in a way that made affirmative action unambiguously
constitutional. And recalcitrant Justices could actually be removed from
office by impeachment.
There is little doubt that the political branches have the explicit
authority to take such actions. However, it is equally clear that the
use of such extreme measures as an antidote to Supreme Court ap-
propriations of legislative or executive policymaking power seems in-
consistent with existing conventions about the proper use of those
constitutional powers. But existing constitutional conventions can be
changed.
Professor Mark Tushnet describes a political phenomenon that he
calls constitutional hardball, in which political players seek to combine
rhetoric and action in ways that alter pre-existing understandings of
the constitutional order.'5 Tushnet offers three examples. The first
is the aggressive use of the filibuster by Senate Democrats to block
the confirmation of George W. Bush's more conservative judicial
nominees, and the Republican rejoinder that such use of the fili-
buster has interfered with the President's constitutional power to
make judicial appointments. The second example is the effort by Re-
publican majorities in Colorado and Texas to redraw voting district
lines in ways that would perpetuate Republican control of the legis-
lature, and the ensuing decision of Texas Democrats to resist that ef-
fort by absenting themselves from both the legislature, and the State of
Texas, in order to ensure the absence of a legislative quorum. The
third example is the Republican impeachment of President Clinton
in the House of Representatives despite the absence of a reasonable
likelihood that a Senate conviction would follow. All of these actions
150 Tushnet, supra note 131. See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
1-8 (2003) (describing Tushnet's concept of a new constitutional order).
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were authorized by the letter of the Constitution, but all seemed to
violate pre-existing conventions about what sorts of actions were con-
stitutionally appropriate under what circumstances.
Nevertheless, the political players in each instance were willing to
risk violating existing constitutional norms because they believed the
stakes of the underlying political debate to be very high, and because
they wished to establish a new constitutional order.15' In the context
of affirmative action, the political branches could-with great cere-
mony-use the jurisdiction-stripping power, the amendment power,
and the impeachment power in an unconventional manner precisely
to establish a new constitutional understanding about the proper al-
location of racial policymaking power between the political branches
and the Supreme Court.
There is another way to play constitutional hardball in the context of
affirmative action. The representative branches could adopt an ag-
gressive interpretation of the Article III restrictions on the scope of
federal judicial power that were created by the Supreme Court itself.
Article III limits the judicial power to "[c]ases" and
"[c] ontroversies."' 52 Under the prevailing model of federal adjudica-
tion that emanates from John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
son,' 5 that restriction has come to mean that the federal courts-
including the Supreme Court-are limited to retrospectively resolv-
ing concrete disputes between adversary parties, and are not institu-
tionally competent to render advisory opinions that are prospective
or legislative in nature.54 In reality, it has always been so common for
the Supreme Court to issue opinions designed to have a prospective
effect on the resolution of controversial policy issues that its resolu-
tion of the dispute between the particular parties is typically viewed as
incidental at best.1
5
5
However, the political branches have the power to create a new
constitutional order in which the Marbury-based separation-of-powers
limitation on federal court jurisdiction is actually taken seriously.
The political branches could treat Supreme Court adjudications as
binding on the parties before the Court, but not as creating prospec-
151 See id. at 8-13 (outlining the challenges that politicians must overcome to establish a new
constitutional regime).
152 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
153 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-80 (1803) (setting the foundation forjudicial review).
154 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at 67-90 (discussing how the case or controversy re-
quirement is traceable to the model of adjudication advanced by ChiefJustice Marshall in Mar-
bury).
155 For example, it is difficult to imagine that Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was really about
whether Linda Brown could attend an integrated school. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that
Marbury itself was really about whether William Marbury could get an official piece of paper
naming him ajustice of the peace. Both cases were obviously intended to establish broad, pro-
spective principles of law relating to racial segregation and judicial review, respectively.
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tive legislative-type rules of constitutional law. In the new constitu-
tional order, Supreme Court precedents would be narrowly con-
strued so that they did not control future cases involving different
parties and different fact situations.
Ironically, this approach would have the effect of making Su-
preme Court opinions advisory to the political bodies. Supreme
Court opinions would resolve the particular disputes that were before
the Court, but they would have a prospective effect on legislative and
executive policymakers only to the extent that those policymakers
found the Supreme Court opinions persuasive enough to incorporate
into their own policymaking actions. 
a 6
The new understanding of judicial review that I am advocating is
not unprecedented. I think it is what Thomas Jefferson and Andrew
Jackson had in mind when they argued that Supreme Court adjudica-
tions were not binding on the political branches of government when
the political branches were acting within their own spheres of consti-
tutional authority.157 Moreover, my view is simply an extension of the
view expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the aftermath of Dred Scott.
Lincoln insisted that Supreme Court precedents should be read as
binding in the cases from which they emanated, but should not be
viewed as establishing political rules to govern the coordinate
branches or the voters. For Lincoln, political resistance to a Supreme
Court rule that the voters or the political branches viewed as errone-
ous was important as a means for the getting the Supreme Court to
reverse its disfavored rule. 
15
And, of course, there is always the option of outright defiance. In
response to a Supreme Court decision concerning Indian sovereignty
with which President Andrew Jackson strongly disagreed, Jackson is
reputed to have said: 'John Marshall has made his decision. Now let
him enforce it.' 1 59 As has been noted, President Franklin D. Roose-
velt was also prepared to defy an adverse Supreme Court decision in
1 This is ironic because the gist of the Marbuiy model of adjudication is that Article III
courts do not have the authority to issue advisory opinions. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at
78-85 (discussing advisory opinions).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 (describing the views of Thomas Jefferson and
AndrewJackson on the deference owed to Supreme Court adjudications).
m See SuLLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 21 (discussing the views of Abraham Lincoln
on the deference owed to Supreme Court adjudications).
m See id. at 23 (discussing Andrew Jackson's reaction to the Supreme Court decision in
Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). In fact, the pertinent litigation was abandoned
before a confrontation between Jackson and the Court came to a head. See SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 23 ("[T] he litigation was abandoned before any call for presiden-
tial assistance arose."); see also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969) (discussing Indian cases that created tension between
Jackson and the Supreme Court); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN
PROPERTY 20-35 (1999) (describing the Indian cases andJackson's response).
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the Gold Clause Cases if the need to do so had arisen. '60 And the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court did successfully defy the United States Supreme
Court in the Naim v. Naim litigation, when the United States Supreme
Court chose to back down rather than confront the Virginia Supreme
Court over the issue of miscegenation. 6 1 If all else fails, simple defi-
ance might be the most appropriate response to continued Supreme
Court efforts to override racial policy determinations made by the
representative branches. After all, we did fight a Civil War in re-
sponse to Dred Scott.'
62
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the Supreme Court lacks the relative institu-
tional competence under our constitutional system of separated gov-
ernmental powers to substitute its policy preferences for the policy
determinations made by the politically accountable branches of gov-
ernment concerning how best to implement the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. I have also argued that
the Supreme Court's long history of sacrificing racial minority inter-
ests for the benefit of the white majority disqualifies the Court both
from exercising intrusive judicial review over majoritarian affirmative
action programs adopted to benefit racial minorities, and from read-
ing the Constitution to preclude the representative branches from
pursuing racial balance remedies for the persistent problem of racial
discrimination. I have, therefore, urged the political branches to
sidestep the Supreme Court's troublesome affirmative action deci-
sions to the extent that they are able to do so through the use of
proxies and camouflage techniques. If such creative compliance ef-
forts prove unsuccessful, I have encouraged the political branches to
utilize the full scope of their constitutional powers to persuade the
Supreme Court to reconsider its present conception ofjudicial review
in the affirmative action context. If persuasion fails, I have argued
that the political branches have a constitutional obligation to exercise
their constitutional powers in ways that will subvert the Court's usur-
pation of racial policymaking power, even if such subversion ulti-
mately comes to encompass outright defiance of Supreme Court de-
cisions. To the extent that my position strikes you as extreme, please
consider that to be a measure of how strongly I feel about an issue
that I consider to be more moral than doctrinal.
i6o See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 (discussing speech prepared by Franklin D.
Roosevelt to defy the Supreme Court ruling in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), if an
adverse decision had been handed down).
161 See supra note 149 (describing the Naim v. Naim litigation).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing Dred Scott and the Civil War).
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I anticipate that my subversive advocacy will be met with the
charge that I am essentially promoting lawlessness. I suspect that I
will be accused of impatiently placing my parochial short-term inter-
est in racial equality ahead of the nation's more important long-term
goal of maintaining a stable form of government in which the Su-
preme Court retains the legitimacy needed to operate as the primary
guardian of our individual rights. And I imagine that I will ultimately
be charged with naivet6 for my belief that the majoritarian political
process could ultimately end up being more protective of racial mi-
nority rights than the Supreme Court is likely to be.
My response to the charge of lawlessness is that I am trying to
remedy what I perceive to be the lawlessness of the present regime, in
which the Supreme Court has been permitted to exceed the scope of
its constitutional authority in ways that repeatedly harm the interests
of racial minorities. My response to the charge of impatient parochi-
alism is that I can conceive of few principles as universal as the equal-
ity principle that prohibits invidious discrimination, and that racial
minorities have waited long enough for that principle to be honored
in the United States. My response to the charge of naivet6 is that I
am not so much naive as hopeful. My hope is that the majoritarian
political branches, supported by the majoritarian electorate, will do
more to promote the cause of racial equality if they are no longer
constrained by the discriminatory proclivities that have been exhib-
ited by the Supreme Court throughout its history. How far the cul-
ture will go is likely be a direct function of how much the culture ca-
res about racial justice. I may ultimately turn out to be wrong in
placing my hope in the process of representative democracy. But, for
the moment at least, it seems better than the alternative.
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